

## TWO LIVES OR THREE? PERICLES ON THE ATHENIAN CHARACTER (THUCYDIDES 2.40.1–2)

φιλοκαλούμέν τε γὰρ μετ' εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας. πλούτῳ τε ἔργου μᾶλλον καιρῷ ἢ λόγου κόμπῳ χρώμεθα, καὶ τὸ πένεσθαι οὐχ ὁμολογεῖν τινὶ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ διαφεύγειν ἔργῳ αἰσχίον. ἔνι τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλεια, καὶ ἑτέροις πρὸς ἔργα τετραμμένοις τὰ πολιτικὰ μὴ ἐνδεῶς γινῶναι.

J. Kakridis<sup>1</sup> has seen in this famous passage a reflection of the popular debate, conducted most memorably by Amphion and Zethus in Euripides' *Antiope*<sup>2</sup> and Callicles and Socrates in Plato's *Gorgias*,<sup>3</sup> over the respective merits of the *vita activa* and *vita contemplativa*. Normally the intellectual is faulted as lazy and helpless, the politician as an ignorant busybody; yet Pericles, according to Kakridis, claims that Athenians avoid these faults and combine the traits of both lives at their best.

This interpretation accords well with the idealism of the funeral oration, but it falters over what Pericles places between philosophy and politics, *viz.* πλούτος. Kakridis must struggle to account for the transition directly from philosophy to wealth, on the assumption that πλούτῳ τε...χρώμεθα serves to amplify ἄνευ μαλακίας, while ἔνι τε...ἐπιμέλεια extends the description of the non-intellectual life from the private sphere of trade to the public one of politics (pp. 50–1).

These views of Kakridis have never been challenged; yet they are demonstrably wrong, not so much for the awkward assumptions they involve (can μαλακία and πλούτος be opposites?) as because they conflict with the structure of the sentence as defined by τε – a word which Thucydides snatched, so to speak, from the chorus of Greek connectives and elevated to a starring role, and therefore never uses loosely.

τε marks each of the major items in the paragraph, and of these there are not two but three:

- φιλοκαλούμέν τε γὰρ... (καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν...)
- πλούτῳ τε...χρώμεθα (καὶ τὸ πένεσθαι...)
- ἔνι τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλεια (καὶ ἑτέροις...)

Obviously none of the clauses with τε looks forward to the following καί (which merely expands it); the three τε's correspond to each other. This structure is common in Thucydides, often as here with an intermediate καί which is unrelated: 1.2.3 ἢ τε νῦν

<sup>1</sup> *Der thukydideische Epitaphios: ein stilistischer Kommentar* (Zetemata 26, Munich, 1961), 51. The following editions of book 2 will be cited by editor's name alone: G. B. Alberti (Rome, 1972); J. Classen, fifth ed. rev. by J. Steup (Berlin, 1914); H. Stuart Jones, rev. by J. E. Powell (Oxford, 1942); K. W. Krüger, third ed. (Berlin, 1860); O. Luschkat, second ed. (Leipzig, 1960); E. F. Poppo, second ed. rev. by J. M. Stahl (Leipzig, 1875); J. de Romilly (Paris, 1962). The manuscript *sigla* are those of Alberti.

<sup>2</sup> B. Snell, *Szenen aus griechischen Dramen* (Berlin, 1971), 77–103; cf. Euripides, *Ion* 621–47.

<sup>3</sup> *Gorgias* 484c4–486d1; cf. *Republic* 487a, 520c14.

Θεσσαλία καλουμένη καὶ Βοιωτία ('what is now called Thessaly–Boeotia'), Πελοποννήσου τε τὰ πολλὰ... τῆς τε ἄλλης ὅσα ἦν κράτιστα; 2.64.3: 'Ἑλλήνων τε... ἤρξαμεν καὶ... ἀντέσχομεν, πόλιν τε... ὥκησαμεν'.<sup>4</sup>

The *threefold* division of activities – philosophy, wealth and politics – refutes Kakridis' interpretation, but it by no means eliminates the possibility that these words have a basis in popular notions of alternative βίοι, since there existed in antiquity a triple division of lives as well.<sup>5</sup> It is set forth most vividly by Cicero (*Tusculan Disputations* 5.8), who reports from Heraclides of Pontus a story about Pythagoras:<sup>6</sup> when asked by Leon the tyrant of Phlius what trade he followed, he replied that he was a φιλόσοφος. The word was new to Leon, who pressed for an explanation of the difference between philosophers and other men, and Pythagoras answered with a parable: life, he said, was like a *panegyris*,<sup>7</sup> to which some came to compete and win prizes, others to buy and sell, still others – the most noble – to observe and study what happened; 'item nos, quasi in mercatus quandam celebritatem ex urbe aliqua, sic in hanc vitam ex alia vita et natura profectos alios gloriae servire, alios pecuniae, raros esse quosdam qui ceteris omnibus pro nihilo habitis rerum naturam studioso intuerentur: hos se appellare sapientiae studiosos, id est enim philosophos.'

A similar division of lives formed the starting point of other glorifications of the philosopher. In *Republic* VIII 580d Plato argues that the three parts of the soul correspond to three pleasures, and that the pursuit of these – wisdom, glory and wealth – defines three kinds of life: διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λέγομεν τὰ πρῶτα τριττὰ γένη εἶναι, φιλόσοφον, φιλόνηκον, φιλοκερδές (581c). Each kind is praised most highly among those who live by it, but it is only the philosopher (who has experienced all three and possesses φρόνησις) whose judgement we may trust.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle's praise of the contemplative life is reserved for the end, but foreshadowed at the start (I. v 1095b14 ff.) with the observation that men derive their ideas of happiness from the lives they lead. To the foolish majority

<sup>4</sup> 'Quibus in exemplis non decipi debemus, quod interdum inter τε–τε interpositum est καί, quod non pertinet ad τε, sed priori membro aliquid adiungit' B. Hammer, *De τε particulae usu Herodoteo, Thucydideo, Xenophonteo* (Diss. Leipzig, 1904), 48. Taking the second or third τε here with following καί would be impossible, since the sentence would then be left in asyndeton; but the first τε carries no such insurance against misinterpretation, and so it has been viewed as prospective with καί φιλοσοφοῦμεν by Classen and Steup, and omitted entirely (with ABFM<sup>3</sup>) by Krüger. On τε...τε...τε in general see J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*, second ed. (Oxford, 1954), 504–5; for its use in Thucydides, Hammer 48–9 (note especially 8.48.4–5: ὁ τε Ἀλκιβιάδης... βασιλεῖ τε... τὰς τε ξυμμαχίδας πόλεις). For (οὐ)τε γὰρ...τε...τε elsewhere in Thucydides cf. 2.39.2, 47.4; 3.13.3; 4.126.5.

<sup>5</sup> A. J. Festugière, 'Les trois vies', *Acta Congressus Madvigiani* (Copenhagen, 1958), ii. 131–78; R. Joly, 'Le thème philosophique des genres de vie dans l'antiquité classique', *Mémoires de l'Académie royale de Belgique* 51.3 (1956); W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* (second ed., Oxford, 1962), appendix II, 'On the Origin and Cycle of the Philosophic Ideal of Life', 426–61 (originally in German, *Sitzungsberichte der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Ph.-hist. Kl., 1928); W. Burkert, 'Platon oder Pythagoras? Zum Ursprung des Wortes "Philosophie"', *Hermes* 88 (1960), 159–77.

<sup>6</sup> Heraclides fr. 88 Wehrli. For the other testimonia to Heraclides' story (Sisicrates *apud* Diog. Laert. 8.8 = *FHG* iv. 303, Diog. Laert. 1.12 = fr. 87 Wehrli, Iamblichus, *Vita Pythag.* 58–9) see Joly (above n. 5) 43–52 and Burkert (above n. 5) 160–4. It is not likely that Aristotle had told the story already in the *Protrepticus* (B 18 Düring); see Burkert 166–9.

<sup>7</sup> Cicero's verbose 'mercaturum eum, qui haberetur maximo ludorum apparatu totius Graeciae celebritate' is an attempt to retain the mercantile, athletic and social connotations of this word. For the comparison of life to a πανηγυρίς cf. Menander fr. 416b Koerte, Alexis fr. 219 Kock, Teles p. 10.13 Hense.

happiness is pleasure,<sup>8</sup> and their life is one of sensual gratification (ἀπολαυστικός), but others have different ideas: *τρεῖς γὰρ εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ προύχοντες* (sc. βίοι), ὁ τε νῦν εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικός καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός. Aristotle does not, in the end, see this scheme as conclusive – he is by no means as certain as Plato that either of the last two lives is to be rejected<sup>9</sup> – but he is willing to start with the three-fold classification, which he had used already in the *Protrepticus* (B 97–105 Düring) and *Eudemian Ethics* (1215a35).

The life of philosophical inquiry is therefore consistently opposed to those lives which pursue honour (in politics or elsewhere)<sup>10</sup> and profit (or pleasure). Werner Jaeger, who first drew critical attention to the relationship between the three texts I have just summarised, observed that the mendacious Heraclides must have been the first to foist the ‘three lives’ on Pythagoras, and added that such a division could not have existed before Plato and the tripartite soul.<sup>11</sup> While the first of these conclusions justly received nearly unanimous assent,<sup>12</sup> the second did not,<sup>13</sup> since it depended on a questionable *argumentum ex silentio*: the threefold division of human activity is a natural one<sup>14</sup> – it is implicit, e.g. in the judgement of Paris,<sup>15</sup> and has been claimed as Indo-European by Georges Dumézil<sup>16</sup> – and although no earlier threefold scheme appeared to assign a βίος directly to the philosopher, it seemed unlikely that Plato was the first to do so. More or less the same three motives enumerated by Heraclides’ Pythagoras are ascribed by Herodotus to Greek visitors to Egypt under Cambyses (3.139): οἱ μὲν, ὡς οἰκός, κατ’ ἐμπορίην, οἱ δὲ στρατευόμενοι, οἱ δὲ τινες καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς χώρας θεηταί.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>8</sup> ἡδονή is substituted for Plato’s πλοῦτος; wealth, says Aristotle, is useful only for the sake of the pleasure it brings. Similarly Plato’s τιμή is rejected as too superficial a goal for the political life, since honour is sought only as a recognition of other qualities (1095b22–6); Aristotle himself suggests ἀρετή as a more plausible goal, but admits that it is not inextricably linked to the essential element of this life, which is action (1095b29–34).

<sup>9</sup> For a sampling of modern discussions of this fact see A. O. Rorty, ‘The Place of Contemplation in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*’ in Rorty (ed.), *Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics* (Berkeley, 1980), 393 n. 1.

<sup>10</sup> Because he insists in the *Republic* that only the philosopher ought to govern, Plato must restrict the inferior γένος φιλότιμον to the spheres of athletics and warfare. An earlier version of the threefold division (*Phaedo* 68c) had combined the φιλότιμοι and the φίλαρχοι (*Phaedo* 82c).

<sup>11</sup> Jaeger (above n. 5) 432. He was reacting against J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, fourth ed. (London, 1930), 98, who judged Heraclides’ story authentic and consequently assumed the Platonic tripartite soul to have a Pythagorean origin (see his commentary on *Phaedo* 68c2).

<sup>12</sup> Of the studies cited above n. 5, see Joly 33, Festugière 133, Burkert 164. Exceptions are W. K. C. Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy* i (Cambridge, 1962), 165 (following Alister Cameron, *The Pythagorean Background of the Theory of Recollection* [Menasha, Wisconsin, 1938], 34), and J. S. Morrison, ‘The Origin of Plato’s Philosopher-Statesman’, *CQ* 52 (1958), 208.

<sup>13</sup> Joly 27, Burkert 165; an exception is Festugière 133.

<sup>14</sup> See H. Usener, ‘Dreiheit’, *RhM* 58 (1903), 1–47.

<sup>15</sup> See the hypothesis to Cratinus’ *Dionysalexandros* (Kassel–Austin, *Poetae Comici Graeci* iv. 140) lines 13–19: <διδόμενον> αὐτῷ παρὰ μ(έν) Ἡρα[ς] τυραννίδο(ς) ἀκινήτου, πα[ρ]ὰ δ’ Ἀθηνᾶς εὐψυχί(ας) κ(α)τὰ πόλεμο(ν), τῆς δ’ Ἀφροδί(της) κάλλιστό(ν) τε κ(αί) ἐπέραστον αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν, κρίνει ταύτην νικᾶν. If the description given of his satyr play *Krisis* by Athenaeus xv 687c (F 361 Radt) is to be trusted, Sophocles seems to have retained three τέλη (ἡδονή, φρόνησις and ἀρετή) while reducing their representatives to two to accommodate them to the tragic agon; see T. C. W. Stinton, *Euripides and the Judgement of Paris* (JHS Supplementary Paper 11, London, 1965), 8, and Ruth Scodel, *Euripides’ Trojan Trilogy* (*Hypomnemata* 60, Göttingen, 1980), 102. (To the personifications of Aphrodite as ἡδονή cited by Deubner, *Roscher’s Lexicon* iii. 2107, add Plato, *Philebus* 12b.)

<sup>16</sup> See especially *Jupiter Mars Quirinus* (Paris, 1941).

<sup>17</sup> Joly 57, Burkert 165. A similar scheme seems to lie behind Bacchylides 10.38–51 (Wilamowitz, *Sappho und Simonides* [Berlin, 1913], 186–9), and one of the Stobaeus quotations of

If at this point we return to Thucydides' analysis of Athenian character in 2.40.1 – expressed, as has been seen, in terms of φιλοσοφία, πλοῦτος and τὰ πολιτικά –, we find in it for the first time a precise correspondence with the scheme of Plato, Aristotle and Heraclides, and a decisive confirmation that the classification they used was independent of the Academy.

Aided by the knowledge that Thucydides' organising principle was a common one, we may discern two further features of Pericles' words which have been misunderstood by commentators, with unfortunate results. First, in his programme for the funeral oration (2.36.4), he announces that he will consider the ἐπιτήδευσις, πολιτεία and τρόποι of his people, and in carrying out the first two tasks (2.37–39) he speaks of the society and government of Athens *as a whole*; yet τρόποι belong only to *individuals*, and it is to these that he turns in 2.40, as his later summary makes clear (2.41.3 ξυνελών τε λέγω τήν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν... καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον...). Second, despite the use of the first person plural (φιλοκαλοῦμεν, φιλοσοφοῦμεν, χρώμεθα), it would be preposterous to hold – as many seem implicitly to do – that the simultaneous pursuit of philosophy, wealth and political power is here ascribed to *every single citizen* of Athens, especially since in the case of wealth and politics an explicit reference is added to those outside these spheres as well (καὶ τὸ πένεσθαι... καὶ ἑτέροις πρὸς ἔργα τετραμμένοις). These three categories are presented rather as *alternatives*,<sup>18</sup> for the same reason they were used by Plato and Aristotle – they seemed to cover all the possibilities.

Let us turn to details. In the first sentence (φιλοκαλοῦμεν... μαλακίας), the objections raised against εὐτέλεια in the mistaken belief that it could refer only to Athenian *public* buildings may now be set aside.<sup>19</sup> Similarly it is no longer necessary to dilute the force of φιλοσοφοῦμεν to 'general culture',<sup>20</sup> since it need not apply equally to every Athenian. In the following sentence dealing with wealth (πλούτῳ... αἰσχρῶν) Pericles envisages a society where a man's financial condition can serve only as a stimulus to action, either to use his wealth or to escape his poverty.<sup>21</sup> It is rich in contrasts, and also in complexities that are characteristically Thucydidean: the positive-negative contrasts in both clauses ('X μᾶλλον ἢ Y', 'οὐκ Y ἀλλὰ X'),<sup>22</sup> the interlacing word order whereby τὸ πένεσθαι οὐχ ὁμολογεῖν τινι αἰσχρόν = οὐκ αἰσχρόν τινι ὁμολογεῖν τὸ πένεσθαι,<sup>23</sup> the positive adjective αἰσχρόν contrasted with

Democritus (whose authenticity is however doubtful; see Z. Stewart, 'Democritus and the Cynics', *HSCP* 63 [1958], 179–91) states δόξα καὶ πλοῦτος ἄνευ ξυνέσιος οὐκ ἀσφαλέα κτήματα (B77).

<sup>18</sup> For double τε of alternatives cf. Euripides, *Ion* 853 (θανεῖν τε ζῶν τε φέγγος εἰσορᾶν), *IA* 56, *Heracleidae* 153–4, Aesch. *Supp.* 380.

<sup>19</sup> A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* ii (Oxford, 1956), 119: 'it is difficult to be happy about this clause... τὸ φιλόκαλον was not pursued in Athens with an eye to economy.' On an individual level, however, φιλοκαλεῖν is virtually a synonym for φιλοσοφεῖν, as seen by Burkert 174, de Vries on Plato, *Phaedrus* 248d3 and H. Flashar, *Der Epitaphios des Perikles* (*Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 1969), 22 n. 39; it is closer to the aristocratic ἐρᾶν τῶν καλῶν (Pind. *Pyth.* 11.50, Theognis 696; cf. Plato, *Meno* 77b4) than to 'die Liebe zur Kunst' (Kakridis 51). The praise of an individual for εὐτέλεια is entirely conventional; see R. Vischer, *Das einfache Leben* (Göttingen, 1965), 27–9.

<sup>20</sup> Guthrie, *HGP* vi (Cambridge, 1981), 332 n. 2, Burkert 174. On the other hand Flashar (above n. 19) 23 was forced to conclude that the only wealthy philosopher–politician Thucydides could have had in mind was Pericles himself.

<sup>21</sup> For a collection of other views on the subject see J. Hemelrijk, *Penia en Ploutos* (Diss. Utrecht, 1925), 132–9. Pericles uses more or less the same words in 42.3 to describe the life the dead have rejected in favour of dying for their city: πλούτου... ἀπόλαυσιν ~ πλούτῳ... χρώμεθα, διαφυγῶν αὐτήν (sc. πένιαν) ~ τὸ πένεσθαι... διαφεύγειν.

<sup>22</sup> See Kakridis (above n. 1) 28–9, D. A. Russell on 'Longinus', *On the Sublime* 9.4.

<sup>23</sup> J. D. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style* (Oxford, 1952), 54–5.

the comparative αἴσχιον;<sup>24</sup> and the inevitable struggle of λόγος against ἔργον, in which the second ἔργω is contrasted with the final element of ὁμο-λογεῖν.

Yet the final sentence on politics is the least understood of all, since here the notion that all three categories must apply universally has even led to the rejection of the text. 'τοῖς αὐτοῖς in the first clause means the Athenians generally' says Gomme (p. 121), 'and there is no "other class" of Athenians to oppose to them.' His opinion is shared by almost all editors, who endorse attempts to alter ἐτέροις to complement rather than contrast with the first clause.<sup>25</sup> Gomme's idea of both τοῖς αὐτοῖς and ἐτέροις is however mistaken. First, in the sentence ἐνι τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλεια, the combination οἱ αὐτοί merely 'stresses the combination of two predicates [here the two objective genitives οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν], which as a rule apply only separately', and is precisely equivalent to Latin *idem*.<sup>26</sup> In this sense οἱ αὐτοί may be attached by Thucydides either to the first predicate as here (cf. 2.40.3, 41.1; 3.47.5; 4.17.1) or to the second one (1.23.3; 3.21.3; 7.18.3).<sup>27</sup> It cannot therefore be opposed directly to ἐτέροις since its force is adverbial, nor can it designate an exclusive group to which the supervision of οἰκεία can be confined. Secondly, with ἐτέροις (sc. ἐνι) Pericles adds (as he did in τὸ πένεσθαι κτλ. above) that those not engaged in this particular pursuit<sup>28</sup> are far from uninterested in it (μὴ ἐνδεῶς γινῶναι, litotes). The 'correction' of Richards (*CR* 7 [1893], 19) to ἐτέροις <ἕτερα> is therefore not only unnecessary, but actually destructive of the thought, as several recent scholars – unfortunately no editors among them – have seen.<sup>29</sup>

Freely translated, then, this is what Pericles claims for his countrymen:

For in the first place (τε) we seek what is noble with moderation in expense, and seek wisdom without becoming soft; furthermore (τε), wealth is for us an opportunity to act rather than something about which to speak boastfully, and as for poverty, it is not a disgrace for anyone to admit to it, but it is a disgrace not to attempt actively to escape it; finally (τε), those who manage our city do the same for their households as well, and others, even though they pursue their trades, have a thorough knowledge of politics.

Although Pericles makes use of the same scheme of lives as the philosophers, his purpose is different; none of the three lives is rejected in favour of another, and each is so qualified as to imply that it is of value only as far as it harmonises with Athenian society as a whole. Despite this impartiality it is of course no accident that the life

<sup>24</sup> This is not as unusual as Kakridis 52 seems to think; cf. Kühner–Gerth i. 24 n. 2 and, e.g. Thucydides 2.35.1 εὖ τε καὶ χεῖρον, 37.1 μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ' ἐς πλείονας.

<sup>25</sup> Stuart Jones (in the apparatus), Poppo–Stahl, Classen–Steup, Luschnat, de Romilly and Alberti; Krüger is alone in defending the text.

<sup>26</sup> Barrett on Euripides, *Hippolytus* 1000–1001; cf. Jebb on Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannus* 457; e.g. *Philoctetes* 119 σοφός τ' ἂν αὐτὸς κάγαθὸς κεκλή' ἅμα.

<sup>27</sup> 6.80.4 is more complex: placed in the second of two parallel conditions, οἱ αὐτοί emphasises that the Spartans will suffer through either of two possible outcomes. — 2.40.2 (οἱ αὐτοὶ ἦτοι κρῖνομέν γε ἢ ἐνθυμούμεθα ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα) is different entirely, as noted by H. Herter, 'Comprensione ed azione politica', *Studi in onore Gino Funaioli* (Rome, 1955), 138: here there is rather a *disjunction* of two predicates, so that we must obviously delete οἱ, with all manuscripts except C and G (so most editors, Stuart Jones being a notable exception). αὐτοί alone then serves to mark the contrast with τόν... μὴδὲν τῶνδε μετέχοντα (as seen by M. Pohlenz, 'Thukydidesstudien I', *Nachrichten von der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen* 1919, 126 n. 1). For such a contrast between different cases cf. 2.37.1 χρώμεθα... πολιτεία οὐ ζηλούση... παράδειγμα δὲ μάλλον αὐτοὶ ὄντες... (Herter and Classen–Steup take αὐτοί as 'without help', but that would add nothing to the sense here.)

<sup>28</sup> πρὸς (ἐπὶ, εἰς) ἔργα τρέπεσθαι = 'pursue one's own business'; see L. Edmunds, *CR* 22 (1972), 171–2. The participle is of course concessive.

<sup>29</sup> Edmunds (above n. 28) and Flashar (above n. 19) 22 n. 40.

of service to the city, closest to the speaker's heart and elaborated in 40.2–3, occupies the final and emphatic position.<sup>30</sup>

*Harvard University*

J. S. RUSTEN

<sup>30</sup> For hints and corrections on several points I am indebted to Albert Henrichs, Donald Morrison and Ruth Scodel. In locating the passages adduced at the end of note 4 – a task for which the existing lexicographical tools for Thucydides were worthless – I had the aid of computer tapes of the text supplied by the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae in Irvine, California, and programs written by Gregory Crane.